Introduction
Climate models indicate that increases in winter stream flow are likely in many parts of Ireland (Sweeney, et al. 2003 , Charlton, et al. 2006 , SteeleDunne, et al. 2008 , with the implication that more flooding is in store for riverine residents. 
Climate change adaptation in cities
Climate change adaptation in cities has become an increasing focus of research by geographers and others (Fünfgeld, 2010 , Carter, 2011 , Hanson, et al. 2011 , Hunt and Watkiss, 2011 , Leichenko, 2011 , Rosenzweig, et al. 2011 . Adaptation research draws from and builds on an already extensive literature on natural hazards in urban contexts (Mitchell, 1999 , Pelling 2003 , Pelling and Wisner, 2009 , Chatterjee, 2010 . Flood hazards in particular have begun to receive increased attention from researchers across Europe (Mitchell, 2003 , Johnson, et al. 2007 , Parvin, et al. 2008 , Whittle, et al. 2010 , Dawson, et al. 2011 , Walker and Burningham, 2011 while the challenges associated with adaptation in Europe (Naess, et al. 2005 , Amundesen, et al. 2010 , Biesbroek, et al. 2010 , Lugeri, et al. 2010 , Mechler, et al. 2010 and Ireland (Falaleela, et al. 2011, Kopke and are also the subject of increasing scrutiny. Out of these different bodies of work has come a concern that the high adaptive capacity present in many developed countries may not automatically lead to successful adaptation (O'Brien, et al. 2004 , Repetto, 2008 , Moser, 2010 .
The literature on climate change adaptation has highlighted several circumstances that enable or hinder effective decision-making in the face of hazards. Amundsen, et al. (2010) examine decision-making among municipal officials in Norway and conclude that direct personal experience of hazards is the most important facilitator of adaptation but that this often leads to a highly reactive decision-making process. A lack of recent direct experience of hazards may attenuate concern and reduce the likelihood of adaptive or preparatory actions being taken (Harvatt, et al. 2011) . It has also been suggested that reactive decision-making, particularly in response to surprise events may not bring about new or radical changes in policy but surprise events can act as a catalyst for changes that were already likely (Johnson, et al. 2005 , Penning-Rowsell, et al. 2006 .
The ways in which knowledge is shared and disseminated among officials and stakeholders and across different levels of governance also helps to shape decision-making and policy (Carmin, et al. 2009 ). Top down approaches that originate from national or international sources or other outside influences are often not the main drivers of local change (Anguelovski and Carmin, 2011) and top down policy can be ineffective due to slow rates of implementation at lower levels of governance (Tunstall, et al. 2009 ). Narratives that raise awareness and the actions they promote can also be heavily influenced by institutional structures or organisational cultures (Harries and Penning-Rowsell, 2011) . These factors are important considerations in both an Irish and a European context. Flood hazards policy in Ireland is largely formulated at a national level although it has undergone some modification in recent years in response to policy changes at the European level. Cross-scale governance is increasingly important in European cities as the EU plays an increased role in both hazards and climate adaptation policy.
A mismatch between the operating requirements of institutions under "normal" conditions and during emergencies can play a central role in influencing the vulnerability and adaptation of local populations. Institutions that have been designed with clearly understood areas of responsibility, well defined geographical jurisdictions and appropriate types of expertise do not always perform effectively when faced with hazards that emerge quickly, cross institutional borders, combine disparate causes, produce impacts in distant places, and require the application of cross-disciplinary knowledge (Robbins, et al. 2008) . All of these challenges are present in Ireland, even though floods are not a new problem. Floods have complex human and non-human drivers that do not fit neatly within the skill sets of professionals in the agencies that are charged with their management. Governance structures that were perhaps suited to the circumstances that prevailed at the time they were created may not be well positioned to address contemporary issues (Dodds, et al. 2010) .
Power relations both within and between institutions have been identified as an important influence on the decision-making process (Koch, et al. 2007) . It is also likely that the power of formal state actors plays a particularly import role in defining approaches to the issue, influencing the behaviour of other state and non state institutions and actors. Koch, et al. (2007) have emphasised the role of institutional actors in South Africa in defining climate change and ranking it relative to other concerns such as economic growth, job creation or poverty reduction. How a problem is defined, whether it is considered a problem at all and how its importance is perceived relative to other issues are among the key factors influencing the types of decisions that are subsequently taken (O'Riordan and Jordan, 1999 , Koch, et. al. 2007 , O'Connor, 2001 . It is clear that adaptation to urban climate change is influenced by a variety of situational contexts that set the boundary conditions for framing decisions and management strategies. The flood experience of Cork in 2009 offers an opportunity to study these contexts at close range.
Flooding in Cork
In many ways Cork City provides an ideal case study for an analysis of decision-making and policy responses to both contemporary flood hazards and the challenges likely to emerge from climate change. Due to its physical setting the city has a long history of exposure to flood hazards. Much of the city centre is built on what is now a large island between two channels of the River Lee, both of which are tidal. These channels are the last vestiges of a more extensive surface drainage network. Much of the modern centre island lies at elevations just above the highest spring tides. As a result it is exposed to both fluvial and tidal flooding.
On the western side of the city, lands on both river banks form part of the flood plain of the River Lee, an area of frequent inundation. On the eastern side, much of what is now the docklands area is situated on land reclaimed from the estuary of the Lee between 1774 and 1841 (Coughlan, 2009 ). This district remains liable to flooding due to its low elevation and poor drainage but despite its exposure, this portion of the city has been primed for extensive redevelopment. With the relocation of all of the city's port functions to locations further downstream, the long term plans for this area include the construction of large scale residential and commercial developments (Cork City Council 2001 , Cork City Council, 2008 , Cork City Council, 2009 ). The hydrology of the River Lee has also been modified by the construction of two upstream dams at Inniscarra and Carrigadrohid. These were completed during the 1950s and were built primarily for hydroelectric power, not flood control.
However they have been used to reduce floods in the past (Fitzpatrick and Bree, 2001 ).
Published research reveals that two hundred and ninety floods were recorded in Cork between 1841 and 1988 (Tyrrell and Hickey 1991) while several additional floods occurred between 1988 and the present. There have been numerous relatively minor events but the city's history also includes large floods leading to loss of life and substantial economic costs.
The earliest documented reports of flooding in Cork date from 1633 when several bridges are believed to have been swept away by the River Lee (Tuckey, 1837 cited Hickey, 2010) . In 1789 a river flood described as being between 1.5m to 2m deep in some parts of the city killed at least one resident (Cawley, et al. 2005 , Hickey, 2010 . One of the most severe floods struck in November 1853 when 12 people were killed, with several of these deaths occurring when St. Patrick's Bridge was partially swept away (Cawley, et al. 2005 , Hickey, 2010 .
River floods in 1916 were among the worst experienced and were described as comparable to the 1853 event (Cawley, et al. 2005) . It is worth noting that the 2009 flood was not the first time a release of water from the Inniscarra dam led to flooding in Cork City with similar but less severe floods having occurred in 1960 and 1988 (Hickey, 2010) .
Methodology
The research on which this investigation of the Cork flood is based was part of a larger study of urban vulnerability to flooding in Ireland that examined, how available knowledge is used by local decision-makers in preparation for hazard events, how hazards are framed and conceptualised by those decision-makers for the purposes of policy-making and management, to 535 tonnes of water per second was passing through the dam and the ESB has claimed that the event had a return period of 800 years (Hickey, 2010) . Much of the city centre and the western suburbs experienced heavy flooding. Fortunately no fatalities occurred but economic losses and disruption to the life of the city was considerable. The municipal water treatment plant was damaged, leaving many of the city's residents without water for several days (Hickey, 2010) . Classes at University College Cork were cancelled after a large portion of the campus was flooded. Flood waters also surrounded the Mercy University Hospital requiring key staff to travel to and from work by boat. It has been estimated that the total economic costs of the flood may exceed €100 million (Hickey, 2010) .
Public attention has focused on two aspects of the event: (1) a perceived failure to
give adequate warning to the population of the city and (2) isolation from social and economic contexts that shape both the formation of policy and the vulnerabilities of human populations (Mitchell, et al. 1989 , Watts, 1989 , Mustafa 1998 , Platt 1999 , O'Neill 2006 .
The Arterial Drainage Acts were the keystone of Ireland's flood hazard policy from 1945 until the mid 1990s when emphasis began to shift towards flood prevention in urban areas. Despite this change, the emphasis on drainage has continued to influence how flood hazards are conceptualised and understood, as well as the types of responses that are adopted.
Institutional cultures formed when engineering and technological approaches were the norm can remain dominant even after alternative policies have become the favoured option (Harries and Penning Rowsell, 2011) . Floods continue to be viewed fundamentally as a problem of drainage and the reasons for addressing them in this way are seen primarily as economic, with little consideration given to future climate change.
An analysis of the City Council minutes in Cork, Dáil Éireann debates and interviews with local officials illustrates the dominance or a risk management paradigm that emphasises the control and prevention of physical exposure as the primary policy-making objective.
Floods are viewed as controllable through the application of expert knowledge, usually that of engineers. When flooding occurs it is considered a failure of these professionals to properly apply their expertise to the challenge. All floods regardless of their size, origin or impact are often treated in the same way at local City Council meetings. Typically a City
Councillor will ask that the City Manager direct the engineering or drainage department to conduct an investigation into a specific flooding problem and to find a solution that prevents the flood from reoccurring. The approach is similar regardless of whether the flood is simply an accumulation of water on an individual street that creates a traffic hazard, or a larger event that inundates multiple properties. In almost all cases floods are seen as preventable given the appropriate level of engineering expertise and the availability of sufficient funding.
Discussions emphasise the "prevention" and "elimination" of floods and the "protection" of local residents. This appears to be largely supported by the City Managers whose replies often focus on the availability of funding and other resources to provide for engineering solutions rather than the wisdom of the engineering solutions themselves. When a flood occurs it is often seen as an indication that the City's artificial drainage network has failed to function adequately because it is assumed that it should be possible to virtually eliminate flooding in a modern city. This illustrates how local decision-making is the product of both a dominant discourse and related institutional structures at both local and national levels. The dominant discourse views floods as something that can be managed and controlled. This links to the institutional structure of local government in Ireland which almost always assigns responsibility for flood hazards to the engineering or drainage department of the local authority. A loop is created where engineering is considered the optimal solution in part because engineers are given responsibility for floods, but that responsibility is given because floods are viewed as a problem engineers can fix. The historical focus on arterial drainage undoubtedly shaped these structures and institutional cultures formed when engineering was the preferred flood mitigation policy can continue to shape local practice. This focus on engineering excludes different perspectives (e.g. natural science) and knowledge (e.g. human ecological), among others, which might offer alternative strategies for flood loss mitigation.
A similar trend is visible in the discussion of flood hazards in the national parliament. Another commented "Much of this flooding could have been avoided and it caused unnecessary damage". These comments and many others made during the Committee's meetings illustrate the dominance of a conception of flood hazards that assumes that flooding can be prevented or at least dramatically reduced through a combination of dams, weirs and flood defences. This approach to flood risk management also creates a reactive decisionmaking process in which local policy and practice is heavily shaped by a retrospective analysis of past events. In the present era of concern about increasing future climate risks this approach may be fraught with difficulties.
A conception of flood hazards that sees floods as a risk largely external to society and views flood prevention as the centre piece of any flood hazards mitigation efforts was also evident in interview responses. Engineering interventions appeared to be viewed as the ideal option both for the management of current flood hazards and for any future hazards due to the impacts of climate change. Most respondents were confident that not only was engineering the preferred option for the future, but that it was providing protection against current flood risks. Several respondents were confident that the hydroelectric dams on the River Lee allowed for control and management of the river that would prevent flooding. They focused on coastal flooding as this was viewed as lacking the same control. An engineer commented, "there was a hydro electric scheme built on the Lee and obviously that has been beneficial in terms of controlling our river flooding. If there are heavy rainfall events or adverse conditions and we know about them in advance then the ESB can deal with the river water coming down".
He contrasted this perceived control over river flooding with the exposure to coastal flooding, commenting "but we've no control at the other end". hazards policy in Ireland and Europe. Engineering solutions and dams in particular often prevent smaller more frequent events but the false sense of security this can create often increases vulnerability to larger but less frequent floods (Wisner, et al. 2004, López-Marrero and Yarnal, 2010) . Engineering solutions certainly work in some cases. During a flood in 1986 it is estimated that the attenuation provided by the two dams on the River Lee retained the water levels in Cork City at almost 1m lower than would have been the case had the dams not been present (Fitzpatrick and Bree, 2001) . However this false sense of security may have helped to increase the vulnerability of Cork City to larger floods. Despite some forewarning of the potential for misplaced confidence (Fitzpatrick and Bree, 2001 ), Cork appears to have been largely unprepared for larger flooding events. While it was fortunate that no fatalities occurred in November 2009 this appears to have been down to luck and a prompt response from the emergency services, rather than to the overall level of preparedness. Prior to 2009, the two dams to the west of Cork were seen as providing an effective means of preventing river flooding. While the City had an emergency plan for dealing with hazards of various kinds, no dedicated flood warning system was in place. Despite media coverage of the potential for flooding many of the city's residents were unprepared and awoke in the early hours of the morning to find their homes quickly filling with water. It is clear that the false sense of security highlighted by hazards researchers elsewhere (Wisner, et. al., 2004, López and Yarnal, 2010) had well and truly set in.
An emphasis on quantitative risk management and technological fixes has been extensively critiqued by geographers and other social scientists. Management approaches that view floods as a drainage problem that can be quantified, measured and assessed through natural science research methods assume that this approach will allow for the accurate calculation of return periods and the likelihood of future flood events. This assumption may prove to be inaccurate in the context of global climate change as the retrospective analysis of past events becomes a less reliable guide to the future. Recent research in Ireland has already expressed concern that analysis of past climate is no longer a reliable guide for future events (Kiely, et al. 2010) . Probabilistic thinking which often dominates risk assessment (Wilkinson, 2010) focuses solely on the question of how often a particular event may occur. Such thinking alone may not be an effective means of preparing for future hazards as because it
neglects to consider what may happen if a more extreme scenario unfolds (Jacob, et al. 2001) .
Not only are risk-based approaches imprisoned by past experience, they may encourage the selection of regulatory standards for flood prevention that are achievable by prevailing engineering technologies at acceptable cost, rather than more stringent safety margins that are more technically challenging and less cost effective. Risk based approaches often imply a level of control and manageability that may be inappropriate in the context of the complex challenges presented by flood hazards particularly in the context of global climatic change (Pidgeon and Butler, 2009 ). This belief in control, combined with the probabilistic approach allows little scope for consideration of unusual or surprise events that do not fit within its predictions. Such surprises are often the source of greatest catastrophe precisely because the fall outside our expectations (Beck, 2009) . Risk management approaches often assume that such control can be achieved through the application of appropriate technological or engineering innovations. Hazards geographers have extensively critiqued overreliance on the application of an engineering fix to flood hazards (White, 1945 , Platt, 1982 , PenningRowsell, et al. 1998 , Penning-Rowsell, 2000 , Wisner, et al, 2004 , Changnon, 2005 , Kahn and Mustafa, 2007 , López-Marrero and Yarnal, 2010 . These critiques have highlighted the potential for failure of engineering fixes and the likelihood of increased losses when events occur that exceed the design capacity of an engineering project (Wong and Zhao, 2001 , Wisner, et al. 2004 , Changnon, 2005 López-Marrero and Yarnal, 2010) . Social theorists such as Ulrich Beck (1992 Beck ( , 1998 Beck ( , 1999 Beck ( , 2009 ) and Bruno Latour (1993 Latour ( , 2003 have offered even more sweeping critiques that question belief in the liner progression of modernity to a point where we can eliminate all of today's risks and hazards. Engineering and technological fixes also tend to focus on the immediate cause of hazards rather than addressing their underlying drivers (Penning-Rowsell, et al. 1998 , Penning-Rowsell, 2000 . Risk based approaches that focus solely on engineering solutions to particular flood problems often fail to consider the variety of factors and contexts which have been found to influence hazards losses (Mustafa, 1998 , Pelling 1999 , Cutter and Finch, 2008 , Eakin, et al. 2010 , López-Marrero and Yarnal, 2010 , Whittle, et al. 2010 , Wolf, et al. 2010 . Risk management approaches also privilege certain types of knowledge and certain practices or responses over others (Beck, 1992 (Beck, , 2009 ).
By placing responsibility for flood hazards in the hands of a small group of experts the range of alternative responses to hazards (Mitchell, 2008) is limited. The role of expertise in environmental governance has been the subject of an extensive literature in geography and other social sciences with researchers increasingly recognising the complexity that the relationships between groups and individuals with varying degrees of expertise and knowledge brings to environmental decision-making (Birkenholtz, 2008 , Prince, 2010 ).
An additional key feature of both the Cork event and flooding in the Shannon basin are worth noting. All of the state agencies involved in testimony before the Oireachtas Committee on the Environment appeared keen to avoid responsibility for the flooding and its consequences. This is evident in the blame game that has taken place between Cork City
Council and the ESB regarding whose responsibility it was to warn the public of the impending flood threat. In the words of the Oireachtas Committee's report "Throughout our This tendency to avoid responsibility may be comparable to a phenomenon described as organised irresponsibility (Beck 2009 ). Focusing on national and international institutions Beck suggests that this organised irresponsibility can lead to the rationalisation and denial of the existence of particular risks. In the context of environmental hazards in local cities, organised irresponsibility may lead to acknowledgment that some risks exist (they are hard to deny after they have been realised as a flood disaster) but to a denial of responsibility for their occurrence or for the emergency management response to them. The notion of organised irresponsibility suggests a deliberate attempt to avoid responsibility for hazards management but it is more likely that emergencies require managerial skills different from normal operations and these have not yet been institutionalized. This has been shown by Robbins et al. (2008, p. 96) However this aspect of the analysis merely quantifies the numbers of properties within flood risk zones. Higher population density is equated with higher vulnerability and the analysis does not attempt to differentiate between residents within flood prone areas. Vulnerability is defined solely as a unit of exposure. This conception of vulnerability contrasts sharply with the extensive geographic literature on the socioeconomic factors that shape hazard losses (Kleinosky, et al. 2006 , Cutter and Finch, 2008 , Eakin, et al. 2009 , Mustafa, et al. 2010 , Wolf et al. 2010 . Whether it is possible to present information on vulnerability in formats that are easily applicable to policy-making is the subject of ongoing debate among vulnerability researchers (Mustafa, et al. 2010) but its exclusion from current policy in Ireland appears to be a conceptual rather than a methodological issue. The absence of a more expansive conceptualisation of vulnerability may prove to be a critical flaw in the design of CFRMPs that may only become clear during future disasters when some groups suffer greater losses than others.
While economic losses receive some consideration in the analysis of flood hazards, they are narrowly defined. The draft CFRMP states that economic loss occurs when "floodwater gets above the threshold level of a building, for example an entrance door to a building" (Office of Public Works, et. al., 2010, p. 40) . This interpretation neglects situations where buildings are isolated but not physically inundated or where the infrastructure on which they depend is damaged or disrupted without impairment of a building's integrity. It also excludes the costs of business interruption and loss of customers for commercial enterprises as well as service denial for public sector facilities. Economic loss is tied to the ownership of fixed property and only where water enters regularly occupied structures.
Damage to moveable property (e.g. vehicles), ancillary features (e.g. gardens), access routes (e.g. driveways) and external fittings is apparently not considered. This definition of economic loss also assumes that it is easy to identify which properties have been flooded and which have not. However studies of damage inflicted by a 2007 flood in Hull (U.K.) reveal that costly, unforeseen and delayed "secondary flooding" effects are common (Whittle, et. al., 2010) . In this case, water entered homes beneath the level of the floorboards.
Homeowners initially assumed they have been spared but rising dampness and condensation emerged later to cause the same level of damage as if visible flooding had occurred. In such cases the expert judgment of insurance assessors becomes the criterion for aid, not the standards adopted in flood management regulations (Whittle, et. al., 2010) . Another influential aspect of governance structures in the Republic of Ireland, that contrasts with much of mainland Europe, is the relationship between local and national government and the role that each plays in policy that pertains to hazards and climate impacts. Compared to other countries, local government in Ireland often appears to have a "lesser status" (Callanan, 2003, p.475) . Irish local authorities have significantly fewer areas of responsibility than European counterparts (Tierney, 2003) . Despite this, local governments in Ireland do have responsibility for several functions that are of particular relevance to hazards mitigation and climate adaptation. City and County Councils are the primary regulators of planning and development within their territories (Grist, 2003) . Local authorities are also responsible for emergency management because they usually provide local fire services and they are designated as lead agencies for managing weather The local emphasis of national politics in Ireland also plays a role in shaping many aspects of policy and this is no doubt true of hazards and climate policy. One of the criticisms of national politicians in Ireland is that they focus on local issues and neglect national priorities (Gallagher and Komito, 1999) . This is underlined in records of Dáil Éireann that show how local requests for flood relief are typical and national perspectives rarely get aired in debates or other parliamentary proceedings. This local emphasis in national policy is difficult to change because it may enhance the prospects of re-election for some representatives. Flood defences are a visual manifestation of action even if they are not always the optimal solution. Their physical presence and their ability to make flood waters disappear at least in the short term, ensures they remain the central focus of flood hazards policies.
Conclusions
It is clear that current exposures and vulnerabilities to flood hazards present numerous challenges for Cork and other Irish cities. These challenges are likely to intensify in the future as climate change brings increases in stream flow, sea level rise and changing storm patterns.
Available evidence shows that current policy, decision-making and institutional structures may be ill suited to the dynamic challenges these changes will present. Current policy and practice at both local and national levels of governance remains heavily influenced by a largely reactive decision-making process based on the retrospective analysis of past events.
Reactive experiential based responses are unlikely to facilitate effective adaptation because past experience may prove to be an unreliable guide to future hazards.
Contemporary decision-making is also strongly influenced by a conceptualisation of flooding that fails to distinguish between the physical floods and the losses they induce, as well as an emphasis on large scale engineering and technological fixes as preferred responses. 
